From 1e888d99cc8235767d5479ba8a181cba70aafa1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vitor Pamplona Date: Sat, 17 Feb 2024 17:50:50 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] Adds clarification that kind18 alone cannot be trusted Adds clarification that this requires web of trust validation Adds k-tag to generic reposts Adds optional behavior to client. --- 22.md | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/22.md b/22.md index 028fb0ed..5e96f8a3 100644 --- a/22.md +++ b/22.md @@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ Kind 18 informs the network that the owner of the pubkey is migrating to a new k } ``` -Close acquaintances to the owner should verify the intention off-nostr and signal their assessment of the owner's intentions by following the new key. +`Kind:18`s suggestion to move to a new key **alone** can't be trusted because the owner's keys might have leaked. It MUST be verified by Web of Trust. + +Close acquaintances to the owner should verify the intention off nostr and signal their assessment of the owner's intentions by following the new key. Others can follow based on their individual trust on such those acquaintances. ## Interpretation @@ -31,9 +33,13 @@ There can be multiple `kind:18`s pointing to separate keys. Finding which event ## Information retention -Supporting Relays and Clients MUST reject Event Deletion ([NIP-09](09.md)) requests of `kind:18`s. +Clients SHOULD send `kind:18` to as many relays as possible, not only to the owner's relay list. -Clients SHOULD use Generic Repost (`kind:16`) with a stringified version of the `kind:18` to warn followers and guarantee its retention in as many relays as possible. +Relays and Clients MUST reject Event Deletion ([NIP-09](09.md)) requests of `kind:18`s. + +Clients SHOULD use Generic Repost (`kind:16`) with a stringified version of the `kind:18` and a `k` tag to `18` to let users warn followers and guarantee `kind:18`'s retention as much as possible. + +Generic Re-posts events simply warn followers and MUST NOT be considered the user's final decision on which key to switch to. Contact lists are the only source of verification. ## Client Behavior @@ -43,6 +49,8 @@ Clients SHOULD offer ways to investigate and verify if: 1. the transition to a new key was intended by the owner OR 2. if this is an attack and the new key is controlled by an attacker. +Clients MAY download follow lists of the user's contact lists and display when a follow has switched to a new key. + It's ok to delay verification until trusted keys start informing their assessments. Upon verification, Clients SHOULD offer transition to the new key by: