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21.md
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@ -43,8 +43,7 @@ Ids and signatures omitted and pubkeys shortened for readability.
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[^q1]: https://t.me/nostr_protocol/26059
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[^q1]: https://t.me/nostr_protocol/26059
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Rationale
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## Rationale
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---------
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[NIP-04](04.md) is flawed because its event contents are encrypted, but the metadata around it is not, and by the nature of Nostr as a protocol designed for public communication in general anyone is able to query relays for any event they want -- thus it's possible to anyone to track conversations between any other Nostr users, not _exactly what_ they're saying, but to whom they're chatting and how often.
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[NIP-04](04.md) is flawed because its event contents are encrypted, but the metadata around it is not, and by the nature of Nostr as a protocol designed for public communication in general anyone is able to query relays for any event they want -- thus it's possible to anyone to track conversations between any other Nostr users, not _exactly what_ they're saying, but to whom they're chatting and how often.
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@ -59,8 +58,7 @@ This NIP, if used in conjunction with relays that are trusted to honor it and no
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[^1]: Not considering, of course, the million other features Telegram offers, that are irrelevant to this document.
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[^1]: Not considering, of course, the million other features Telegram offers, that are irrelevant to this document.
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[^2]: Not considering, of course, the cryptographic protocols that Signal uses to provide forward secrecy and other advanced functionality which are already not present in NIP-04.
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[^2]: Not considering, of course, the cryptographic protocols that Signal uses to provide forward secrecy and other advanced functionality which are already not present in NIP-04.
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Comparison with other proposals
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## Comparison with other proposals
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-------------------------------
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Over the last months a number of other proposals were made to try to improve the lack of privacy NIP-04 provides[^3][^4][^5].
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Over the last months a number of other proposals were made to try to improve the lack of privacy NIP-04 provides[^3][^4][^5].
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@ -75,8 +73,7 @@ Although all these proposals solve the issue in some way of another, and it can
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[^6]: For example, even with ephemeral keys, if the general public still have access to all the events some time-analyses and other heuristics can be used to try to track chat activity between Nostr users.
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[^6]: For example, even with ephemeral keys, if the general public still have access to all the events some time-analyses and other heuristics can be used to try to track chat activity between Nostr users.
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[^7]: Another example: even with ephemeral keys, it can be assumed that relays will know at least the IP address of the clients that are using it for the kind-4 messages, so they will have almost as much metadata as before -- which brings us back, again, to some level of trust on these relays to not reveal this metadata to the public, as in the current proposal.
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[^7]: Another example: even with ephemeral keys, it can be assumed that relays will know at least the IP address of the clients that are using it for the kind-4 messages, so they will have almost as much metadata as before -- which brings us back, again, to some level of trust on these relays to not reveal this metadata to the public, as in the current proposal.
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Further possibilities
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## Further possibilities
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---------------------
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Some random things that can be optionally done based on this NIP:
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Some random things that can be optionally done based on this NIP:
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