Merge pull request #716 from coracle-social/NIP-59

Introduce NIP-59 gift wrap
2024-11-09 22:09:06 -05:00 · 2024-01-29 13:06:25 -03:00 · 2024-01-29 13:06:25 -03:00 · 9efafe2294
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+NIP-59
+======
+
+Gift Wrap
+---------
+
+`optional`
+
+This NIP defines a protocol for encapsulating any nostr event. This makes it possible to obscure most metadata
+for a given event, perform collaborative signing, and more.
+
+This NIP *does not* define any messaging protocol. Applications of this NIP should be defined separately.
+
+This NIP relies on [NIP-44](./44.md)'s versioned encryption algorithms.
+
+# Overview
+
+This protocol uses three main concepts to protect the transmission of a target event: `rumor`s, `seal`s, and `gift wrap`s.
+
+- A `rumor` is a regular nostr event, but is **not signed**. This means that if it is leaked, it cannot be verified.
+- A `rumor` is serialized to JSON, encrypted, and placed in the `content` field of a `seal`. The `seal` is then
+  signed by the author of the note. The only information publicly available on a `seal` is who signed it, but not what was said.
+- A `seal` is serialized to JSON, encrypted, and placed in the `content` field of a `gift wrap`.
+
+This allows the isolation of concerns across layers:
+
+- A rumor carries the content but is unsigned, which means if leaked it will be rejected by relays and clients,
+  and can't be authenticated. This provides a measure of deniability.
+- A seal identifies the author without revealing the content or the recipient.
+- A gift wrap can add metadata (recipient, tags, a different author) without revealing the true author.
+
+# Protocol Description
+
+## 1. The Rumor Event Kind
+
+A `rumor` is the same thing as an unsigned event. Any event kind can be made a `rumor` by removing the signature.
+
+## 2. The Seal Event Kind
+
+A `seal` is a `kind:13` event that wraps a `rumor` with the sender's regular key. The `seal` is **always** encrypted
+to a receiver's pubkey but there is no `p` tag pointing to the receiver. There is no way to know who the rumor is for
+without the receiver's or the sender's private key. The only public information in this event is who is signing it.
+
+```js
+{
+  "id": "<id>",
+  "pubkey": "<real author's pubkey>",
+  "content": "<encrypted rumor>",
+  "kind": 13,
+  "created_at": 1686840217,
+  "tags": [],
+  "sig": "<real author's pubkey signature>"
+}
+```
+
+Tags MUST must always be empty in a `kind:13`. The inner event MUST always be unsigned.
+
+## 3. Gift Wrap Event Kind
+
+A `gift wrap` event is a `kind:1059` event that wraps any other event. `tags` SHOULD include any information
+needed to route the event to its intended recipient, including the recipient's `p` tag or NIP-13 proof of work.
+
+```js
+{
+  "id": "<id>",
+  "pubkey": "<random, one-time-use pubkey>",
+  "content": "<encrypted kind 13>",
+  "kind": 1059,
+  "created_at": 1686840217,
+  "tags": [["p", "<recipient pubkey>"]],
+  "sig": "<random, one-time-use pubkey signature>"
+}
+```
+
+# Encrypting Payloads
+
+Encryption is done following NIP-44 on the JSON-encoded event. Place the the encryption payload in the `.content`
+of the wrapper event (either a `seal` or a `gift wrap`).
+
+# Other Considerations
+
+If a `rumor` is intended for more than one party, or if the author wants to retain an encrypted copy, a single
+`rumor` may be wrapped and addressed for each recipient individually.
+
+The canonical `created_at` time belongs to the `rumor`. All other timestamps SHOULD be tweaked to thwart
+time-analysis attacks. Note that some relays don't serve events dated in the future, so all timestamps
+SHOULD be in the past.
+
+Relays may choose not to store gift wrapped events due to them not being publicly useful. Clients MAY choose
+to attach a certain amount of proof-of-work to the wrapper event per NIP-13 in a bid to demonstrate that
+the event is not spam or a denial-of-service attack.
+
+To protect recipient metadata, relays SHOULD guard access to kind 1059 events based on user AUTH. When
+possible, clients should only send wrapped events to relays that offer this protection.
+
+To protect recipient metadata, relays SHOULD only serve kind 1059 events intended for the marked recipient.
+When possible, clients should only send wrapped events to `read` relays for the recipient that implement
+AUTH, and refuse to serve wrapped events to non-recipients.
+
+# An Example
+
+Let's send a wrapped `kind 1` message between two parties asking "Are you going to the party tonight?"
+
+- Author private key: `0beebd062ec8735f4243466049d7747ef5d6594ee838de147f8aab842b15e273`
+- Recipient private key: `e108399bd8424357a710b606ae0c13166d853d327e47a6e5e038197346bdbf45`
+- Ephemeral wrapper key: `4f02eac59266002db5801adc5270700ca69d5b8f761d8732fab2fbf233c90cbd`
+
+Note that this messaging protocol should not be used in practice, this is just an example. Refer to other
+NIPs for concrete messaging protocols that depend on gift wraps.
+
+## 1. Create an event
+
+Create a `kind 1` event with the message, the receivers, and any other tags you want, signed by the author.
+Do not sign the event.
+
+```json
+{
+  "created_at": 1691518405,
+  "content": "Are you going to the party tonight?",
+  "tags": [],
+  "kind": 1,
+  "pubkey": "611df01bfcf85c26ae65453b772d8f1dfd25c264621c0277e1fc1518686faef9",
+  "id": "9dd003c6d3b73b74a85a9ab099469ce251653a7af76f523671ab828acd2a0ef9"
+}
+```
+
+## 2. Seal the rumor
+
+Encrypt the JSON-encoded `rumor` with a conversation key derived using the author's private key and
+the recipient's public key. Place the result in the `content` field of a `kind 13` `seal` event. Sign
+it with the author's key.
+
+```json
+{
+  "content": "AqBCdwoS7/tPK+QGkPCadJTn8FxGkd24iApo3BR9/M0uw6n4RFAFSPAKKMgkzVMoRyR3ZS/aqATDFvoZJOkE9cPG/TAzmyZvr/WUIS8kLmuI1dCA+itFF6+ULZqbkWS0YcVU0j6UDvMBvVlGTzHz+UHzWYJLUq2LnlynJtFap5k8560+tBGtxi9Gx2NIycKgbOUv0gEqhfVzAwvg1IhTltfSwOeZXvDvd40rozONRxwq8hjKy+4DbfrO0iRtlT7G/eVEO9aJJnqagomFSkqCscttf/o6VeT2+A9JhcSxLmjcKFG3FEK3Try/WkarJa1jM3lMRQqVOZrzHAaLFW/5sXano6DqqC5ERD6CcVVsrny0tYN4iHHB8BHJ9zvjff0NjLGG/v5Wsy31+BwZA8cUlfAZ0f5EYRo9/vKSd8TV0wRb9DQ=",
+  "kind": 13,
+  "created_at": 1703015180,
+  "pubkey": "611df01bfcf85c26ae65453b772d8f1dfd25c264621c0277e1fc1518686faef9",
+  "tags": [],
+  "id": "28a87d7c074d94a58e9e89bb3e9e4e813e2189f285d797b1c56069d36f59eaa7",
+  "sig": "02fc3facf6621196c32912b1ef53bac8f8bfe9db51c0e7102c073103586b0d29c3f39bdaa1e62856c20e90b6c7cc5dc34ca8bb6a528872cf6e65e6284519ad73"
+}
+```
+
+## 3. Wrap the seal
+
+Encrypt the JSON-encoded `kind 13` event with your ephemeral, single-use random key. Place the result
+in the `content` field of a `kind 1059`. Add a single `p` tag containing the recipient's public key.
+Sign the `gift wrap` using the random key generated in the previous step.
+
+```json
+{
+  "content": "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",
+  "kind": 1059,
+  "created_at": 1703021488,
+  "pubkey": "18b1a75918f1f2c90c23da616bce317d36e348bcf5f7ba55e75949319210c87c",
+  "id": "5c005f3ccf01950aa8d131203248544fb1e41a0d698e846bd419cec3890903ac",
+  "sig": "35fabdae4634eb630880a1896a886e40fd6ea8a60958e30b89b33a93e6235df750097b04f9e13053764251b8bc5dd7e8e0794a3426a90b6bcc7e5ff660f54259"
+  "tags": [["p", "166bf3765ebd1fc55decfe395beff2ea3b2a4e0a8946e7eb578512b555737c99"]],
+}
+```
+
+## 4. Broadcast Selectively
+
+Broadcast the `kind 1059` event to the recipient's relays only. Delete all the other events.
+
+# Code Samples
+
+## JavaScript
+
+```javascript
+import {bytesToHex} from "@noble/hashes/utils"
+import type {EventTemplate, UnsignedEvent, Event} from "nostr-tools"
+import {getPublicKey, getEventHash, nip19, nip44, finalizeEvent, generateSecretKey} from "nostr-tools"
+
+type Rumor = UnsignedEvent & {id: string}
+
+const TWO_DAYS = 2 * 24 * 60 * 60
+
+const now = () => Math.round(Date.now() / 1000)
+const randomNow = () => Math.round(now() - (Math.random() * TWO_DAYS))
+
+const nip44ConversationKey = (privateKey: Uint8Array, publicKey: string) =>
+  nip44.v2.utils.getConversationKey(bytesToHex(privateKey), publicKey)
+
+const nip44Encrypt = (data: EventTemplate, privateKey: Uint8Array, publicKey: string) =>
+  nip44.v2.encrypt(JSON.stringify(data), nip44ConversationKey(privateKey, publicKey))
+
+const nip44Decrypt = (data: Event, privateKey: Uint8Array) =>
+  JSON.parse(nip44.v2.decrypt(data.content, nip44ConversationKey(privateKey, data.pubkey)))
+
+const createRumor = (event: Partial<UnsignedEvent>, privateKey: Uint8Array) => {
+  const rumor = {
+    created_at: now(),
+    content: "",
+    tags: [],
+    ...event,
+    pubkey: getPublicKey(privateKey),
+  } as any
+
+  rumor.id = getEventHash(rumor)
+
+  return rumor as Rumor
+}
+
+const createSeal = (rumor: Rumor, privateKey: Uint8Array, recipientPublicKey: string) => {
+  return finalizeEvent(
+    {
+      kind: 13,
+      content: nip44Encrypt(rumor, privateKey, recipientPublicKey),
+      created_at: randomNow(),
+      tags: [],
+    },
+    privateKey
+  ) as Event
+}
+
+const createWrap = (event: Event, recipientPublicKey: string) => {
+  const randomKey = generateSecretKey()
+
+  return finalizeEvent(
+    {
+      kind: 1059,
+      content: nip44Encrypt(event, randomKey, recipientPublicKey),
+      created_at: randomNow(),
+      tags: [["p", recipientPublicKey]],
+    },
+    randomKey
+  ) as Event
+}
+
+// Test case using the above example
+const senderPrivateKey = nip19.decode(`nsec1p0ht6p3wepe47sjrgesyn4m50m6avk2waqudu9rl324cg2c4ufesyp6rdg`).data
+const recipientPrivateKey = nip19.decode(`nsec1uyyrnx7cgfp40fcskcr2urqnzekc20fj0er6de0q8qvhx34ahazsvs9p36`).data
+const recipientPublicKey = getPublicKey(recipientPrivateKey)
+
+const rumor = createRumor(
+  {
+    kind: 1,
+    content: "Are you going to the party tonight?",
+  },
+  senderPrivateKey
+)
+
+const seal = createSeal(rumor, senderPrivateKey, recipientPublicKey)
+const wrap = createWrap(seal, recipientPublicKey)
+
+// Recipient unwraps with his/her private key.
+
+const unwrappedSeal = nip44Decrypt(wrap, recipientPrivateKey)
+const unsealedRumor = nip44Decrypt(unwrappedSeal, recipientPrivateKey)
+```