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Typos
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59.md
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59.md
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@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ This NIP relies on [NIP-44](./44.md)'s versioned encryption algorithms.
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This NIP uses three main primitives to protect the metadata of an event: `rumor`s, `seal`s, and `gift wrap`s.
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- A `rumor` is any unsigned nostr event. If it is leaked, it cannot be verified.
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- A `seal` signs the encrypted rumor in it's `.content`, making the rumor verifiable without revealing it.
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- A `seal` signs the encrypted rumor in its `.content`, making the rumor verifiable without revealing it.
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- A `gift wrap` encrypts any other signed event using random private keys to a known destination in its `tags`.
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The rumor carries the content itself but if it leaks it will be rejected by relays and clients and can't be authenticated. This provides a measure of deniability.
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The `seal` exposes the signer, but not the contents or the receiver. The `gift wrap` exposes the receiver, or an alias to the receiver, but not the signer.
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The 3 primitives can be used together or separatedly depending on the application.
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The 3 primitives can be used together or separately depending on the application.
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## The Seal Event Kind
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@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Relays SHOULD only serve `kind 1059` events intended for the marked recipient ba
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Clients SHOULD only send wrapped events to destination relays that offer this protection.
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Relays MAY choose not to store Gift-wrapped events due to them not being publicly useful. Clients MAY choose
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Relays MAY choose not to store gift-wrapped events due to them not being publicly useful. Clients MAY choose
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to attach a certain amount of proof-of-work to the wrapper event per [NIP-13](13.md) in a bid to demonstrate that
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the event is not spam or a denial-of-service attack.
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