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Vitor Pamplona 2024-02-17 18:01:59 -05:00 committed by GitHub
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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Key Migration
`draft` `optional`
Kind 18 informs the network that the owner of the pubkey is migrating to a new key.
`Kind:18` informs the network that the owner of the pubkey is migrating to a new key.
The event MUST contain a single `p` tag with the new pubkey owner will be using.
@ -23,21 +23,21 @@ The event MUST contain a single `p` tag with the new pubkey owner will be using.
## Confirmation Chains
Since the owner's keys might have leaked, `Kind:18`s **alone** can't be trusted.
Since the owner's keys might have leaked and this event might come from an attacker, `Kind:18`s **alone** can't be trusted.
Close acquaintances to the owner should verify the owner's intention off nostr and signal their conclusion by adding the new key to their contact lists.
Others can follow based on their individual trust on such those acquaintances.
Others may choose to follow suit based on their trust in such acquaintances.
## Interpretation
The presence of one or more `kind:18`s, no matter who writes it, declares the key to be out of use, unreliable, unsafe and potentially stolen: No event, past and future, from this key can be trusted anymore.
The presence of one or more `kind:18`s, no matter who writes it, declares the key to be out of use, unreliable, unsafe, and potentially stolen: No event, past and future, from this key can be trusted anymore.
Users that have a `kind:18` published by their keys MUST migrate to a new key.
There can be multiple `kind:18`s pointing to separate new keys. Finding which event is the right one requires observing contact lists of trusted keys.
## Information retention
## Information Retention
Clients SHOULD send `kind:18` to as many relays as possible, not only to the owner's relay list.
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Clients SHOULD offer ways to investigate and verify if:
1. the transition to a new key was intended by the owner OR
2. if this is an attack and the new key is controlled by an attacker.
Clients MAY download follow lists of the user's contact lists and display when a follow has switched to a new key.
Clients MAY download follow lists of the user's contact lists and display them when a follow has switched to a new key.
It's ok to delay verification until trusted keys start informing their assessments.