From d7293a3924143b222ffbda0dba11a373136e1269 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Staab Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2023 08:34:56 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Introduce NIP-59 gift wrap --- 59.md | 250 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 250 insertions(+) create mode 100644 59.md diff --git a/59.md b/59.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd841cf --- /dev/null +++ b/59.md @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +NIP-59 +====== + +Gift Wrap +--------- + +`optional` + +This NIP defines a protocol for encapsulating any nostr event. This makes it possible to obscure most metadata +for a given event, perform collaborative signing, and more. + +This NIP relies on [NIP-44](./44.md)'s versioned encryption algorithms. + +# Overview + +This protocol uses three main concepts to protect the transmission of a target event: `rumor`s, `seal`s, and `gift wrap`s. + +- A `rumor` is a regular nostr event, but is **not signed**. This means that if it is leaked, it cannot be verified. +- A `rumor` is serialized to JSON, encrypted, and placed in the `content` field of a `seal`. The `seal` is then + signed by the author of the note. The only information publicly available on a `seal` is who signed it, but not what was said. +- A `seal` is serialized to JSON, encrypted, and placed in the `content` field of a `gift wrap`. + +This allows the isolation of concerns across layers: + +- A rumor carries the content but is unsigned, which means if leaked it will be rejected by relays and clients, + and can't be authenticated. This provides a measure of deniability. +- A seal identifies the author without revealing the content or the recipient. +- A gift wrap can add metadata (recipient, tags, a different author) without revealing the true author. + +# Protocol Description + +## 1. The Rumor Event Kind + +A `rumor` is the same thing as an unsigned event. Any event kind can be made a `rumor` by removing the signature. + +## 2. The Seal Event Kind + +A `seal` is a `kind:13` event that wraps a `rumor` with the sender's regular key. The `seal` is **always** encrypted +to a receiver's pubkey but there is no `p` tag pointing to the receiver. There is no way to know who the rumor is for +without the receiver's or the sender's private key. The only public information in this event is who is signing it. + +```js +{ + "id": "", + "pubkey": "", + "content": "", + "kind": 13, + "created_at": 1686840217, + "tags": [], + "sig": "" +} +``` + +Tags MUST must always be empty in a `kind:13`. The inner event MUST always be unsigned. + +## 3. Gift Wrap Event Kind + +A `gift wrap` event is a `kind:1059` event that wraps any other event. `tags` MUST include a single `p` tag +containing the recipient's public key. + +The goal is to hide the sender's information, the metadata, and the content of the original event from the public. +The only public information is the receiver's public key. + +```js +{ + "id": "", + "pubkey": "", + "content": "", + "kind": 1059, + "created_at": 1686840217, + "tags": [["p", ""]], + "sig": "" +} +``` + +# Encrypting Payloads + +Encryption is done following NIP-44 on the JSON-encoded event. Place the the encryption payload in the `.content` +of the wrapper event (either a `seal` or a `gift wrap`). + +# Other Considerations + +If a `rumor` is intended for more than one party, or if the author wants to retain an encrypted copy, a single +`rumor` may be wrapped and addressed for each recipient individually. + +The canonical `created_at` time belongs to the `rumor`. All other timestamps SHOULD be tweaked to thwart +time-analysis attacks. Note that some relays don't serve events dated in the future, so all timestamps +SHOULD be in the past. + +Relays may choose not to store gift wrapped events due to them not being publicly useful. Clients MAY choose +to attach a certain amount of proof-of-work to the wrapper event per NIP-13 in a bid to demonstrate that +the event is not spam or a denial-of-service attack. + +To protect recipient metadata, relays SHOULD guard access to kind 1059 events based on user AUTH. When +possible, clients should only send wrapped events to relays that offer this protection. + +To protect recipient metadata, relays SHOULD only serve kind 1059 events intended for the marked recipient. +When possible, clients should only send wrapped events to `read` relays for the recipient that implement +AUTH, and refuse to serve wrapped events to non-recipients. + +# An Example + +Let's send a wrapped `kind 1` message between two parties asking "Are you going to the party tonight?" + +- Author private key: `0beebd062ec8735f4243466049d7747ef5d6594ee838de147f8aab842b15e273` +- Recipient private key: `e108399bd8424357a710b606ae0c13166d853d327e47a6e5e038197346bdbf45` +- Ephemeral wrapper key: `4f02eac59266002db5801adc5270700ca69d5b8f761d8732fab2fbf233c90cbd` + +## 1. Create an event + +Create a `kind 1` event with the message, the receivers, and any other tags you want, signed by the author. +Do not sign the event. + +```json +{ + "created_at": 1691518405, + "content": "Are you going to the party tonight?", + "tags": [], + "kind": 1, + "pubkey": "611df01bfcf85c26ae65453b772d8f1dfd25c264621c0277e1fc1518686faef9", + "id": "9dd003c6d3b73b74a85a9ab099469ce251653a7af76f523671ab828acd2a0ef9" +} +``` + +## 2. Seal the rumor + +Encrypt the JSON-encoded `rumor` with a conversation key derived using the author's private key and +the recipient's public key. Place the result in the `content` field of a `kind 13` `seal` event. Sign +it with the author's key. + +```json +{ + "content": "AqBCdwoS7/tPK+QGkPCadJTn8FxGkd24iApo3BR9/M0uw6n4RFAFSPAKKMgkzVMoRyR3ZS/aqATDFvoZJOkE9cPG/TAzmyZvr/WUIS8kLmuI1dCA+itFF6+ULZqbkWS0YcVU0j6UDvMBvVlGTzHz+UHzWYJLUq2LnlynJtFap5k8560+tBGtxi9Gx2NIycKgbOUv0gEqhfVzAwvg1IhTltfSwOeZXvDvd40rozONRxwq8hjKy+4DbfrO0iRtlT7G/eVEO9aJJnqagomFSkqCscttf/o6VeT2+A9JhcSxLmjcKFG3FEK3Try/WkarJa1jM3lMRQqVOZrzHAaLFW/5sXano6DqqC5ERD6CcVVsrny0tYN4iHHB8BHJ9zvjff0NjLGG/v5Wsy31+BwZA8cUlfAZ0f5EYRo9/vKSd8TV0wRb9DQ=", + "kind": 13, + "created_at": 1703015180, + "pubkey": "611df01bfcf85c26ae65453b772d8f1dfd25c264621c0277e1fc1518686faef9", + "tags": [], + "id": "28a87d7c074d94a58e9e89bb3e9e4e813e2189f285d797b1c56069d36f59eaa7", + "sig": "02fc3facf6621196c32912b1ef53bac8f8bfe9db51c0e7102c073103586b0d29c3f39bdaa1e62856c20e90b6c7cc5dc34ca8bb6a528872cf6e65e6284519ad73" +} +``` + +## 3. Wrap the seal + +Encrypt the JSON-encoded `kind 13` event with your ephemeral, single-use random key. Place the result +in the `content` field of a `kind 1059`. Add a single `p` tag containing the recipient's public key. +Sign the `gift wrap` using the random key generated in the previous step. + +```json +{ + "content": "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", + "kind": 1059, + "created_at": 1703021488, + "pubkey": "18b1a75918f1f2c90c23da616bce317d36e348bcf5f7ba55e75949319210c87c", + "id": "5c005f3ccf01950aa8d131203248544fb1e41a0d698e846bd419cec3890903ac", + "sig": "35fabdae4634eb630880a1896a886e40fd6ea8a60958e30b89b33a93e6235df750097b04f9e13053764251b8bc5dd7e8e0794a3426a90b6bcc7e5ff660f54259" + "tags": [["p", "166bf3765ebd1fc55decfe395beff2ea3b2a4e0a8946e7eb578512b555737c99"]], +} +``` + +## 4. Broadcast Selectively + +Broadcast the `kind 1059` event to the recipient's relays only. Delete all the other events. + +# Code Samples + +## JavaScript + +```javascript +import {bytesToHex} from "@noble/hashes/utils" +import type {EventTemplate, UnsignedEvent, Event} from "nostr-tools" +import {getPublicKey, getEventHash, nip19, nip44, finalizeEvent, generateSecretKey} from "nostr-tools" + +type Rumor = UnsignedEvent & {id: string} + +const TWO_DAYS = 2 * 24 * 60 * 60 + +const now = () => Math.round(Date.now() / 1000) +const randomNow = () => Math.round(now() - (Math.random() * TWO_DAYS)) + +const nip44ConversationKey = (privateKey: Uint8Array, publicKey: string) => + nip44.v2.utils.getConversationKey(bytesToHex(privateKey), publicKey) + +const nip44Encrypt = (data: EventTemplate, privateKey: Uint8Array, publicKey: string) => + nip44.v2.encrypt(JSON.stringify(data), nip44ConversationKey(privateKey, publicKey)) + +const nip44Decrypt = (data: Event, privateKey: Uint8Array) => + JSON.parse(nip44.v2.decrypt(data.content, nip44ConversationKey(privateKey, data.pubkey))) + +const createRumor = (event: Partial, privateKey: Uint8Array) => { + const rumor = { + created_at: now(), + content: "", + tags: [], + ...event, + pubkey: getPublicKey(privateKey), + } as any + + rumor.id = getEventHash(rumor) + + return rumor as Rumor +} + +const createSeal = (rumor: Rumor, privateKey: Uint8Array, recipientPublicKey: string) => { + return finalizeEvent( + { + kind: 13, + content: nip44Encrypt(rumor, privateKey, recipientPublicKey), + created_at: randomNow(), + tags: [], + }, + privateKey + ) as Event +} + +const createWrap = (event: Event, recipientPublicKey: string) => { + const randomKey = generateSecretKey() + + return finalizeEvent( + { + kind: 1059, + content: nip44Encrypt(event, randomKey, recipientPublicKey), + created_at: randomNow(), + tags: [["p", recipientPublicKey]], + }, + randomKey + ) as Event +} + +// Test case using the above example +const senderPrivateKey = nip19.decode(`nsec1p0ht6p3wepe47sjrgesyn4m50m6avk2waqudu9rl324cg2c4ufesyp6rdg`).data +const recipientPrivateKey = nip19.decode(`nsec1uyyrnx7cgfp40fcskcr2urqnzekc20fj0er6de0q8qvhx34ahazsvs9p36`).data +const recipientPublicKey = getPublicKey(recipientPrivateKey) + +const rumor = createRumor( + { + kind: 1, + content: "Are you going to the party tonight?", + }, + senderPrivateKey +) + +const seal = createSeal(rumor, senderPrivateKey, recipientPublicKey) +const wrap = createWrap(seal, recipientPublicKey) + +// Receiver unwraps with his/her private key. + +const unwrappedSeal = nip44Decrypt(wrap, recipientPrivateKey) +const unsealedRumor = nip44Decrypt(unwrappedSeal, recipientPrivateKey) +```