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62 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
62 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
NIP-22
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======
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Key Migration
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-------------
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`draft` `optional`
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`Kind:18` informs the network that the owner of the pubkey is migrating to a new key.
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The event MUST contain a single `p` tag with the new pubkey owner will be using.
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```js
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{
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"kind": 18,
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"tags": [
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["p", "<pubkey>", "<relay_url>"],
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],
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"content": "<comment to followers>"
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//...
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}
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```
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## Confirmation Chains
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Since the owner's keys might have leaked and this event might come from an attacker, `Kind:18`s **alone** can't be trusted.
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Close acquaintances to the owner should verify the owner's intention off nostr and signal their conclusion by adding the new key to their contact lists.
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Others may choose to follow suit based on their trust in such acquaintances.
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## Interpretation
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The presence of one or more `kind:18`s, no matter who writes it, declares the key to be out of use, unreliable, unsafe, and potentially stolen: No event, past and future, from this key can be trusted anymore.
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Users that have a `kind:18` published by their keys MUST migrate to a new key.
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There can be multiple `kind:18`s pointing to separate new keys. Finding which event is the right one requires observing contact lists of trusted keys.
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## Information Retention
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Clients SHOULD send `kind:18` to as many relays as possible, not only to the owner's relay list.
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Relays and Clients MUST reject Event Deletion ([NIP-09](09.md)) requests of `kind:18`s.
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Clients SHOULD use Generic Repost (`kind:16`) with a stringified version of the `kind:18` and a `k` tag to `18` to let users warn followers and guarantee `kind:18`'s retention as much as possible.
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Generic Re-posts events simply warn followers and MUST NOT be considered the user's final decision on which key to switch to. Contact lists are the only source of confirmation.
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## Client Behavior
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Upon receiving a new `kind:18`, Clients MUST warn their user the pubkey is unsafe.
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Clients MAY download follow lists of follows and display when a follow has switched to a new key.
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It's ok to delay confirmation until trusted keys start informing their assessments.
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Upon confirmation, Clients SHOULD offer transition to the new key by:
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1. Changing the contact list accordingly
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2. Changing any NIP-51 list accordingly
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3. Adding the old key to the Mute List
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