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80 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
80 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
# gRPC Extensions Design Document
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The relay will be extensible through gRPC endpoints, definable in the
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main configuration file. These will allow external programs to host
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logic for deciding things such as, should this event be persisted,
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should this connection be allowed, and should this subscription
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request be registered. The primary goal is allow for relay operator
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specific functionality that allows them to serve smaller communities
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and reduce spam and abuse.
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This will likely evolve substantially, the first goal is to get a
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basic one-way service that lets an externalized program decide on
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event persistance. This does not represent the final state of gRPC
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extensibility in `nostr-rs-relay`.
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## Considerations
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Write event latency must not be significantly affected. However, the
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primary reason we are implementing this is spam/abuse protection, so
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we are willing to tolerate some increase in latency if that protects
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us against outages!
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The interface should provide enough information to make simple
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decisions, without burdening the relay to do extra queries. The
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decision endpoint will be mostly responsible for maintaining state and
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gathering additional details.
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## Design Overview
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A gRPC server may be defined in the `config.toml` file. If it exists,
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the relay will attempt to connect to it and send a message for each
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`EVENT` command submitted by clients. If a successful response is
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returned indicating the event is permitted, the relay continues
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processing the event as normal. All existing whitelist, blacklist,
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and `NIP-05` validation checks are still performed and MAY still
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result in the event being rejected. If a successful response is
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returned indicated the decision is anything other than permit, then
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the relay MUST reject the event, and return a command result to the
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user (using `NIP-20`) indicating the event was blocked (optionally
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providing a message).
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In the event there is an error in the gRPC interface, event processing
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proceeds as if gRPC was disabled (fail open). This allows gRPC
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servers to be deployed with minimal chance of causing a full relay
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outage.
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## Design Details
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Currently one procedure call is supported, `EventAdmit`, in the
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`Authorization` service. It accepts the following data in order to
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support authorization decisions:
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- The event itself
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- The client IP that submitted the event
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- The client's HTTP origin header, if one exists
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- The client's HTTP user agent header, if one exists
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- The public key of the client, if `NIP-42` authentication was
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performed (not supported in the relay yet!)
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- The `NIP-05` associated with the event's public key, if it is known
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to the relay
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A server providing authorization decisions will return the following:
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- A decision to permit or deny the event
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- An optional message that explains why the event was denied, to be
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transmitted to the client
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## Security Issues
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There is little attempt to secure this interface, since it is intended
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for use processes running on the same host. It is recommended to
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ensure that the gRPC server providing the API is not exposed to the
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public Internet. Authorization server implementations should have
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their own security reviews performed.
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A slow gRPC server could cause availability issues for event
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processing, since this is performed on a single thread. Avoid any
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expensive or long-running processes that could result from submitted
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events, since any client can initiate a gRPC call to the service.
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